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The second century B.C. brought with it a change in Rome's 
long standing policy against annexation. The Senate (which 
determined all Roman foreign policy at that time) opposed 
territorial annexation and the accumulation of power by any 
other foreign country. For instance, by approximately 200 B.C. 
both Macedon and Carthage suffered tremendous defeats by Rome. 1 
However, both territories were left unoccupied in hopes that 
each might establish some sort of peaceful coexistence with 
Rome. Unfortunately, neither Carthage nor Macedon appreciated 
this chance for political self-determination. Both eventually 
reverted to hostile ways and the following generation saw one 
faction after another appeal to Rome for protection or 
assistance. Yet these client-states of Rome refused any advice 
not administered by force. 
Rome was drawn ever further into the situation just to 
maintain peace and stability. This intervention culminated in 
146 B.C. with Rome's destruction of Carthage and the Greek city 
of Corinth. 2 In both instances, Rome maintained an outdated 
state policy of self defense in which security was best obtained 
by elimination of all opponents. Rome had all but achieved this 
feat some years prior with its defeat of Hannibal. However, 
Rome never stopped to measure its own strength in comparison to 
the rest of the world. Rome did not yet appreciate the 
implications of its new found superior strength even though 
neighboring countries did. Despite their many contributions to 
society, the Romans were never noted for their intellectual 
expediency. So it is not all that odd that for such a long time 
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Rome experienced the strain of widespread unrest that so often 
accompanies an expanding empire. 
The century of increased annexation prior to 146 would 
eventually induce Rome to readjust her political thinking. The 
city-state government so long ago established to govern the 
Italian peninsula was not equipped to stand up to the task of 
administration abroad. Rome had acquired six new provinces in 
less than one hundred years, yet failed to revise her rigid 
constitutional arrangement to reflect this accumulation of 
territory. 3 These newly acquired provinces were simply 
patrolled by Rome's military. Absolutely no consideration was 
given to political administration at this time. This Roman 
policy of occupation did little to resolve the Republic's 
difficulties with its newfound territories. 
After 146 B.C. Rome was at the brink of a new era as the 
most dominant power in the Mediterranean world. Rome's future 
would be determined by how it adjusted to this newly acquired 
position of dominance. Unfortunately, the stubbornness of the 
ruling class exhibited itself in an incapacity to adapt, 
socially, economically and politically, the policies of the 
Republic to the changing needs of a growing empire. Once a 
military empire ceases to expand, the most common result is 
increased civil strife and violence. The late Roman Republic is 
certainly no exception to this rule. Rome had for centuries 
lived as a military society enhanced further by each and every 
conquest. Rome had funnelled its aggression into a form of 
military expression that yielded it the Mediterranean world. 
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Yet, once this feat had been accomplished, Rome's military began 
to stagnate and no outlet remained by which to vent 
frustrations nor acquire wealth. Perhaps this was the fate of 
which Scipio Africanus had forewarned upon his defeat of 
Carthage. It is as well the reason he did not destroy this rival 
city to Rome. For as long as there was an outside threat to 
Rome there would always be a common point of focus for every 
aspect of society--"Carthago delenda est." It is somewhat ironic 
that Rome's ascendance to world dominance marks the beginning of 
the Republic's demise. 
The century of violence most commonly called the "Roman 
Revolution" was what ensued. It is generally accepted that it 
began with the death of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C. and ended 
with the death of Marc Antony and the ascendance of Octavian as 
Caesar in 30 B.C. 4 The Roman Revolution did begin with the 
death of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C. On this point all 
ancient historians agree. However, there is some speculation as 
to the revolution's ending date. The more appropriate end of 
the Roman Republic should be with the death of Cicero in 43 
B.C., for he was truly the last Roman republican. The later 
struggles of Octavian and Marc Antony had little to do with 
republican politics but were merely battles for control of the 
state. The "Roman Revolution" has received a great deal of 
attention as to its causes and effects, but the event which most 
properly marks its cessation has been greatly overshadowed. 
With the death of Cicero the revolution had come full circle and 
the transition of power was complete. The Senate had succumbed 
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to ambitious military politicians. The two events that most 
appropriately represent the beginning and end of this process 
are the deaths of Tiberius Gracchus (133 B.C.) and Cicero (43 
B.C.). Each man died at the hands of the two opposite factions 
that ultimately tore the Republic apart. 
The first of these two factions was the oligarchy (the 
Senate). They slew not only Tiberius in 133 B.C., but also his 
brilliant younger brother, Gaius, in 121 and Caesar in 44. The 
Senate was comprised of embittered aristocrats who, for various 
reasons, were losing control of their capacity to dominate Roman 
politics. By the time Tiberius Gracchus rose to the heights of 
power, the three hundred member Senate held fast to their 
domination of politics through customs rather than laws. 5 This 
had been the way of Roman politics since the Republic's 
inception. The Senate was held in such high esteem that their 
word was regarded as absolute, even though there was no written 
acknowledgment of this practice. Tiberius and his successors 
became a threat not so much to the senators themselves but to 
these customs by which they governed. 
The second faction was Rome's military leaders. These 
commanders began to seize their opportunities with increasing 
frequency in the turmoil of the first century B.C. Tiberius 
Gracchus unknowingly set a precedent when he challenged the 
authority of the Senate, thus revealing its "Achilles' heal": 
their power was based on custom, not law. Each generation after 
Tiberius saw a new military leader who further challenged 
senatorial power. The struggle between the oligarchy and the 
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military leaders left the Republic to die a slow and agonizing 
death. 
Most ancient historiography claims that the "Roman 
Revolution" ushered in a wave of violence that eroded a highly 
civilized culture. In actuality, violence had always been a 
very integral part of Roman society. Violence was actually 
considered a form of self-help in private disputes. 6 If an 
issue could not be settled constitutionally, violence generally 
ensued. The term "libertas" meant that a man could use force in 
his personal interests to secure his proper dues. 7 In the works 
of Livy, Polybius, Tacitus,and even Cicero references are 
constantly made to this traditional form of self-help. This was 
no more than an expression of community spirit which had 
survived the ages. While new territories and provinces did have 
some effect upon the application of violence to settle disputes, 
the idea of immediate vindication provided a quick yet violent 
solution. This process was considered a form of fidelity to 
Rome to prevent a breach of peace or an overburdened judicial 
system. 8 
What happened after 133 B.C. (and the death of Tiberius 
Gracchus) was the logical progression of violence to the next 
plateau of Roman society: politics. Even Cicero encouraged 
violence, "if undertaken by good men in defense of the 
established order against those who improperly sought to disturb 
it." 9 Herein lies the problem. The constitution and Senate of 
Rome left little room for compromise. The type of popular 
legislation first proposed by Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C. was 
5 
a direct challenge to senatorial rule. Thus, popular 
legislation was met by violence from the Senate as its only 
recourse toward seeking proper dues. Perhaps a closer look at 
the Senate will help determine just exactly what were its 
"proper dues!" 
It has long been maintained that the study of any society 
involves the examination of its ruling class. Therefore, the 
study of the Roman Republic involves the Senate. In the second 
century B.C. Polybius accurately claimed, "the Senate was the 
body that ruled the Roman world." 10 A century later Cicero 
wrote, "the Senate was intended to be the savior, defender, and 
protector of the state." 11 Sallust called the ruling class "an 
oligarchy that managed affairs at home and in war; it held the 
treasury, the provinces, the public office and military glory, 
but the noble families that once dominated the Senate by public 
merit now did by inherited influence." 12 In other words, the 
Romans were becoming a race of adopted peoples. By the first 
century B.C., one-fourth to one-half of senatorial families had 
no son survive long enough to seek political office, and not all 
of the surviving sons had the inclination or ability to enter 
politics. 13 The Senate had no alternative but to recruit 
members from outside the upper echelons of society to replace 
themselves. 
This upset not only the social ladder of Rome but also the 
long standing patron-client relationship. The client was a man 
of inferior status who depended on his patron for personal and 
economic protection; in return, he was expected to serve the 
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needs of his patron. 14 Patronage as a link between men of 
higher and lower status was part of the political structure. In 
Rome emphasis was placed on the "duties" of the individual 
rather than on the "rights." No Roman considered all people to 
be born free and equal in dignity and rights. The idea of 
patronage had been part of the social and political structure 
for years. Yet the men who should have defended this way of 
life (the senators) were declining steadily in number and 
influence both prior to and after 133 B.C. 
Tiberius Gracchus had a dramatic impact upon the procedures 
by which the oligarchy governed. During the 130's B.C., secret 
ballots replaced traditional voice votes. 15 However, to admit 
the development of a crisis in social conditions would be a 
condemnation of the manner in which the oligarchy conducted 
politics. The Senate refused to believe that they did not 
dominate the politics of the day. In essence their position was 
weakening and Tiberius Gracchus exposed this harsh reality by 
turning to popular politics when he was opposed by the Senate. 
The heart of the political turmoil between Tiberius and the 
Senate lay in his land redistribution proposal. Tiberius wanted 
to redistribute Italian land to help the plebeians establish 
farms of a large enough area to be considered eligible for 
military service so that they might replenish the depleted Roman 
ranks. Also, Tiberius had hopes of reuniting many dispossessed 
Italians with their native soil. 16 This would ease social 
tensions in Rome while bolstering the numbers in the military. 
The oligarchy despised Tiberius' plan because it meant that the 
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Senate would have to relinquish a great deal of profitable land 
which had been accumulated by exploitation of the peasent class. 
Redistribution would cut directly into the profits of the 
oligarchy. It also meant that Tiberius would be establishing 
for himself a vast constituency of plebeians primarily loyal to 
him. This proposed redistribution of land would not only 
threaten the oligarchic financial situation but their political 
power base as well. So the Senate opposed Tiberius, who in turn 
resorted to popular politics. 
Tiberius Gracchus destroyed Rome's traditional political 
system. As a member of the governing class, yet opposed to the 
Senate, he sought public opinion as a force to enhance the 
authority of the populace as a useful political tool. He gave 
the popular assembly the status to rival the Senate as a source 
of political authority. His actions established new patterns of 
activity later used by other politicians. Tiberius attacked the 
oligarchy's political as well as financial framework. Tiberius 
was opposed and defeated by Octavius in the consular election of 
133 B.C. He was opposed by the entire Senate, who combined 
forces with Octavius in an effort to remove him from political 
power. However, Tiberius used the popular assembly to depose 
the consul Octavius and restricted the oligarchy's 
constitutional ability to respond to his methods. 17 
The oligarchy had no recourse left available to them. 
Being forced into such a politically competitive situation, they 
responded with an age old custom used for settling personal 
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disputes. The Senate resorted to violence and informally killed 
Tiberius Gracchus and many of his followers. 18 
Consequently, Tiberius is wrongfully credited with the 
legacy of initiating a century's violence commonly called the 
"Roman Revolution" even though it was the first civil bloodshed 
since the kings had been expelled from Rome four hundred years 
earlier. Tiberius is not responsible for the initiation of 
violence, for that was a custom which had long accompanied 
republican life. Tiberius did, however, transfer that violence 
from the personal realm to the political. By destroying the 
traditional political system, Tiberius promoted political 
competition that was much more intense than previously known. 
Self-help emerged as a new political tool and violence increased 
as a means of achieving political goals. 
Tiberius transposed an intense dual party system into 
republican politics which contributed as much as any other 
factor to the Republic's eventual demise. In 133 B.C., 
political battle lines were drawn between the oligarchy and what 
has come to be known as the populares. The oligarchy were 
Rome's leading citizens, the nobility who controlled the Senate. 
The populares have most often been portrayed as the popular 
assembly, but this is somewhat misleading. The opposition to 
the oligarchy was actually not a group at all but ambitious 
individuals who used the consulship or tribunate to take their 
policies directly to the popular assemblies. 19 The uneducated 
masses were much easier to manipulate than the Senate, and much 
less expensive. In essence, the struggle between the populares 
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and oligarchy was symbolic of the greater struggle between the 
oligarchy and the military leaders. 
The turmoil of the late Republic was not simply patrician 
against plebeian. As has already been noted, there had for 
centuries prior to 133 B.C. been an equitable patron-client 
relationship in Rome. So the plausibility of a sudden social 
breakdown in exactly 133 B.C. is unlikely. What is more apt to 
have happened was the m~nipulation of the popular assembly by 
overly ambitious politicians, who had neither the patience nor 
the clientage to endure the Republic's traditional political 
avenues. The oligarchy had always successfully controlled 
republican politics and it was only after Tiberius' failure to 
manipulate the oligarchy that he turned to popular support. 
Many others would follow his example. 
In as much as Tiberius' popular politics set a precedent 
that threatened the Republic, so too did the Senate with it's 
use of violence to resolve this political threat. 
Constitutional incompatibility is often the prelude to 
revolution and the situation in Rome was more complex than the 
Senate could comprehend . By killing Tiberius Gracchus, the 
Senate set themselves up for further reprisals at the hands of 
his younger brother, Gaius. When Gaius followed his elder 
brother's example and attempted to usurp the power of the 
Senate, they once again resorted to violence and killed the 
younger Gracchus. 
There is one principle difference in the Senate's actions 
toward Gaius as compared to his elder brother. In Gaius' case 
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the Senate adapted their emergency powers to this cause and, in 
121 B.C., issued for the first time "the ultimate decree" 
(Senatus Consultum Ultimum). Plainly stated, the ultimate 
decree said "that there was a threat to society of so great a 
magnitude that it required Rome's magistrates to take whatever 
steps needed to ensure that the Republic came to no harm." 20 
The Senate thus granted the noble Opimius absolute control of 
the state (by virtue of the ultimate decree) and he in turn 
formally killed Gaius Gracchus. 21 So, while Tiberius died due 
to an overly emotional violent response of the Senate, Gaius 
died due to a coldly calculated and executed decree. 
The difference between a formal and an informal death 
probably meant little to the Gracchi, but the implications of 
the latter upon the Senate were catastrophic. In their attempt 
to curb the advent of a dictator leading the popular assembly 
against them, the Senate created the legitimate position of 
dictator. The "ultimate decree" gave absolute power to an 
individual to protect the state. Later in the first century 
B.C., it is not clear whether state or individual interests took 
precedent. The Senate's paranoia of a popular assembly rivaling 
it's power caused it to overlook the obvious. The popular 
assembly was not so much a united political force but rather an 
organization manipulated by individuals to rival senatorial 
authority. Gaius, like Tiberius before him, was searching for a 
way to dictate Roman politics. The Senate, by preventing Gaius 
Gracchus from achieving this feat, through the violence of the 
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ultimate decree, provided the vehicle and the opportunity for 
future generations to become dictators over Roman politics. 
For the next eighty years, after the death of Gaius 
Gracchus, violent power struggles dominated Roman politics. 
Marius defeated the northern hordes and was named "Third Founder 
of the City (Rome) in 102 B.C." 22 Within fifteen years Marius 
marched against Rome as an enemy of the state and was conquered 
by Sulla. 23 With the death of Marius and ascendance of Sulla, 
Plutarch wrote, "even the most stupid of Romans understood that 
they had merely exchanged, not escaped tyranny." 24 Pompey 
succeeded Sulla, and Caesar conquered Pompey. All of these men 
possessed military commands, all marched on Rome, and all were 
succeeded by yet another military leader. Even Caesar was 
followed by Antony who eventually yielded to Octavian. 
By the first century B.C. the Roman Republic was dominated 
by military politics. One general succeeded another, and 
whether they defended the Senate or the popular assembly made 
little difference: "might made right." The only thing 
accomplished by these senatorially produced factional politics 
was that they gave any general who so desired a cause for which 
to fight. The cause made little difference as well. The 
accumulation of power was all that concerned any of the 
aforementioned generals. 
The Senate, in dealing with the Gracchi, unknowingly 
provided the perfect opportunity by which to conquer their very 
own Republic. By ushering violence onto the political arena, 
the Senate set a precedent in which Roman politicians killed off 
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all competition. The Senate committed the gravest of all 
tragedies, for out of concern for their own survival they 
created the means of their own destruction. 
While the Senate remained technically intact until the rise 
of Augustus, their power and influence had long since faded. 
The only action of any consequence taken by the Senate in the 
entire first century B.C. was the murder of Julius Caesar. 
Unfortunately for the Senate, by that time Rome's political 
destiny was inevitable. The senators who murdered Caesar were 
the same shallow individuals that killed Tiberius Gracchus. All 
this violence was in the name of an honor which had died with 
the Gracchi, perhaps earlier. These were not the leaders who 
built the Republic, nor were they capable of saving it. Cicero 
most accurately assessed the situation; "our traditions once 
produced great men and great men maintained the traditions. Now 
we have lost the color and even the outline of the picture. The 
traditions are forgotten for we lack the men. It is our crime 
that the state stands only in name." 25 
When the Republic needed strength and leadership most, the 
Senate could not have been weaker or more corrupt. The most 
industrious minds of the entire first century circumvented the 
Senate in favor of a military command. The prestige of 
senatorial tradition yielded to the force of arms. Once their 
credibility had been challenged, the Senate lost control of the 
state's destiny as well as their own. They possessed neither 
the power nor the conviction of spirit to sustain the heritage 
of their ancestors. 
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The addition of three hundred new members to the Senate by 
Sulla in 81 B.C. obviously did not help matters in the Senate.26 
In fact, this act created so much dissention and confusion that 
the Senate's effectiveness as a legislative body vanished. Such 
was the technique of the first century military commanders. They 
weakened the Senate in order to strengthen themselves. 
Republican politics was reduced to corruption and compromise. 
The temporary delicate position of the state's supreme military 
commander once established by Cincinnatus had reverted back to 
the status of tyrant. Although the Senate recognized this 
potential tyrannical threat as early as 133 B.C., it's member's 
refused to jeopardize their own lavish lifestyles to prevent its 
occurrence. Instead they created a dictator to slay a tyrant. 
Vengeance became the mainstay of Roman politics. One violent 
insurrection followed another until the ideals upon which the 
Republic was founded deserted nearly all Senators, save for 
Cicero. 
Cicero was unlike most first century Roman senators in that 
most of his thinking was greatly influenced by the Greek 
philosophic tradition. Shortly after Rome's conquest of Macedon 
and Corinth, literary activity in Rome greatly increased. In 
the first century B.C. any politician of rhetorical prowess 
(like Cicero) drew a great deal of public notice. Cicero took 
advantage of this situation and entered the political arena 
where his fame and reputation grew beyond reproach. Cicero 
believed that men were born for justice which in turn should 
express itself in law and that law was for public promotion of 
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justice rather than the benefit of any group or individual. 27 
Cicero viewed lawlessness as the creator of tyranny under which 
no state could exist in its proper form, because the essential 
characteristic of a state was law. According to Cicero the 
tyrant was any man who seized power illegally or ruled in 
opposition to the constitution of the state, and the slaying of 
that tyrant was not just the right thing to do but the duty of a 
good citizen. 28 Cicero adopted a great deal of his ethical 
ideals from Plato's Republic and attempted to apply them to 
Rome's political situation in a futile attempt to salvage an 
already corrupt society. 
While Cicero understood the deplorable status of the 
Republic, he refused to abandon the hopes for its revival. 
Cicero's dream to restore the Republic (through the Senate) 
created much turmoil with Julius Caesar. Cicero believed in one 
view of the constitution and Caesar quite a different one. 
Cicero believed in senatorial prerogatives while Caesar did not. 
Cicero thus labeled Caesar a tyrant, for what he called 
"opposition to the constitution or rather the institution of the 
state." 29 Rome had submitted to a government led by military 
dictators before (such as Marius, Sulla, and Pompey). Yet the 
Senate considered these situations temporary. Neither Cicero 
nor the Senate was quite ready to accept Caesar's blatant 
attempt to become dictator for life. 
Caesar on the other hand must have known that his death 
would not serve his enemies well. He knew that Antony or 
Octavian would fill his shoes, avenge his death, and seize the 
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state. Unfortunately, the complacent Caesar failed to recognize 
the shortsightedness of his foes, who by killing him hoped to 
restore the Republic. Though Cicero did not take part in the 
murder, he condoned it. In his Second Phillipic, Cicero wrote, 
"this is the first occasion when a man has been killed who was 
not aiming at kingly power but exercising it." 30 Cicero and the 
oligarchy viewed the death of Caesar much in the same light as 
they had the death of Tiberius Gracchus some ninety years prior 
--as a fine and noble deed. 
Upon the death of Caesar a power struggle ensued in which 
Cicero made a futile effort to reestablish a long deceased 
Republic. Cicero hoped to control state politics through public 
oratory. He held assemblies through which he procured arms by 
inducing the weapon makers to work without pay. He also 
collected money and exacted contributions from various allies in 
an effort to rebuild a Senatorial Republic. Given more time 
Cicero may have been successful. However, when Publius 
Ventidius defected to Antony, Cicero lost two legions and all 
hope of victory. 31 Despite all his efforts, Cicero was no 
match for the military leaders and their armies. The same could 
be said of the entire Senate. In 43 B.C. Antony, Octavian, and 
Lepidus formed the Second Triumvirate, thus combining their 
military might to one end--the elimination of all their 
opposition, starting with Cicero. 32 Some years before when 
asked by Caesar to support the First Triumvirate, Cicero refused 
because of his suspicion that the Triumvirate would not respect 
the traditions of the Republic. 33 Cicero's convictions were 
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later confirmed, but the brilliant statesman had missed Caesar's 
point. The Republic was ruined and its city-state structure 
incapable of ruling the vast empire that Rome had come to be. 
But Cicero, one of the Republic's most brilliant senators, 
refused to accept the inevitability of its demise. 
Cicero fought against the Cataline conspiracy and later the 
First Triumvirate. 34 His literary genius allowed him to record 
the Republic in its purest form in De Re Publica and to codify 
Roman law in De Legibus. His brilliance alone did more to 
further Roman republican civilization than any of his 
contemporaries or predecessors. Even upon his death Cicero 
refused to affiliate himself with any one political faction. 
Despite the immense political corruption of the first century 
B.C., he never sought power for his own behalf. Cicero embodied 
steadfast Roman principles and was truly the last, if not the 
greatest, republican. However, that in itself was not enough to 
alter the destiny of the collapsing Republic. 
Cicero died on December 7, 43 B.C., at the hands of a 
gladiator whom he had once defended and exonerated. "His head 
and hands were brought back to Antony ... who placed them at the 
head of his table so that he might gaze upon them during his 
meals." 35 Such has been the fate of many great cultures to 
fall at the hands of those less civilized than themselves. 
It took a little more than a decade after Cicero's death, 
but the matter of Rome's leadership was finally settled, for the 
fate of the Republic had long since been decided. Marc Antony 
and Octavian fell upon each other in a struggle for absolute 
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control of the state. The victor, Octavian, later named himself 
Caesar Augustus and broke with all pre-existing forms of 
government. Though Rome survived for another half millennium 
it's people never again experienced the freedom they once 
enjoyed under the Republic. 
The struggle for the senatorially controlled Republic that 
had begun with Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C. ended with the 
death of Cicero in 43 B.C. Cicero was the last man to define 
and defend republican ideals. His dedication was to his country 
and not to a political faction. The love he had for the 
Republic was exhibited in his staunch defense of it. He opposed 
Sulla, Cataline, Caesar, Antony and Octavian, yet never was he 
named to a faction that sought power for the sake of power 
itself. Unfortunately for Cicero, this was also his undoing for 
he had no power base (other than the Senate) by which to rival 
these all powerful military leaders. Tiberius had pointed out 
some ninety years earlier that the Senate ruled primarily by 
custom. By Cicero's time, the Senate's function had become 
almost completely advisory. The real power in the state lay in 
the military and the generals who led them. Cicero was born 
into an era of power politics and although his desires to retain 
the Republic were quite sincere, they were equally impossible. 
The Republic had died somewhere in the first century B.C., 
either with Marius, Sulla, Pompey or Caesar. With the death of 
Cicero in 43 B.C. the transformation had been completed and the 
only question that remained was which dictator would prevail. 
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